China Extends the “Great Firewall” Into Space

Satellite Internet is becoming an increasingly popular way to get online. But new rules from the Chinese government suggest it wants to make sure its version of space-based broadband comes preloaded with the nation’s elaborate system of online censorship.

The authoritarian state has long restricted domestic access to online content that it deems illegal or a threat to its form of government. This is done via a system known as “The Great Firewall,” using a range of technologies and tactics to block or limit the ability of citizens to connect to foreign websites and online services, including Google, Facebook, and Snapchat. This is primarily done by monitoring and manipulating Web traffic as it passes through China’s Internet infrastructure.

But satellite Internet services, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, could potentially circumvent these controls by allowing users to connect via satellite to ground stations located outside the country, over which the government has no control. That has prompted the Cyberspace Administration of China to release draft rules that would put restrictions on providers of satellite Internet equipment and services designed to reestablish control.

“The problem that China is struggling with right now is that non-Chinese companies such as SpaceX and their Starlink satellite Internet service dominate the satellite Internet space,” says Jeffrey Knockel, a senior research associate at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab. “China is trying to preempt large numbers of users having access to uncensored information before it becomes too large of a problem for them.”

How Satellite Broadband Could Interface With the Great Firewall

Emerging satellite Internet services provide users with a terminal that can connect wirelessly to large constellations of satellites in low Earth orbit. These satellites then forward the users’ Web requests to a ground station that is connected to the terrestrial Internet. The new rules from the CAC mandate that anyone providing satellite Internet equipment or services within the country will have to ensure all data is routed through ground facilities located in China. These would be connected to the country’s domestic Internet infrastructure, ensuring that users’ requests have to pass through the Great Firewall.

It’s currently unclear how the government would enforce this, says Knockel. Satellite Internet terminals are mobile, making it tricky to determine whether they are being used in China. One option would be to simply rely on the user’s billing address, which is how Apple’s censorship of its App Store for China works, says Knockel. The other option would be to prevent companies that don’t comply with the new rules from selling their terminals in China. The regulations mention that satellite Internet companies will be required to obtain licenses and approvals to provide services and produce, assemble, and sell terminal equipment in the country.

If satellite Internet requests are routed through the Chinese terrestrial Internet, then they would be subject to the same kind of restrictions as any other Internet connection. One of the primary ways China controls what users can access is by requiring an Internet service provider to send copies of user requests to the government data centers that implement the Great Firewall, says Dave Levin, an associate professor of computer science at the University of Maryland. If the user attempts to access a restricted website, the Great Firewall detects this and sends a response to the user’s Web client that either cuts the connection or returns a junk IP address. Levin says he suspects China could end up treating satellite Internet companies the same way as other Internet service providers, something backed up by the fact that the new rules say operators will have to collect users’ identity information and report misuse to the authorities.

Wrinkles and (Vehicular) Complications

If someone manages to sneak an unregulated terminal into the country, though, it’s harder to see how the Chinese government could enforce its censorship rules, says Levin. One option would be to deploy satellite dishes around the country to detect communication with these unapproved satellite services, and then put pressure on those companies to prevent these connections.

In the case of Starlink, exerting that kind of pressure might not be too difficult, says Knockel. SpaceX’s owner Elon Musk also runs electric-vehicle maker Tesla, which both manufactures and sells large numbers of vehicles in China. Threatening Tesla’s access to China could provide the government with significant leverage over SpaceX, says Knockel. And for both SpaceX and other foreign service providers, commercial considerations may also come into play. “The Chinese market is huge, and such operators would want continued access to the market,” says Knockel.

Perhaps even more concerning, these new rules could allow China to export its online censorship model abroad as well. Several Chinese companies are developing satellite Internet constellations to rival Starlink, which would also have to comply with the new regulations. Steven Feldstein, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., says China’s commercial satellite Internet services may prove increasingly attractive for authoritarian regimes around the world—because of the mechanisms of state censorship already in the system.

“For countries that want to increase connectivity but are concerned about allowing free information access to their citizens, using Chinese satellite Internet alternatives could be a useful solution,” he says. “Citizens have greater access to information, albeit using a sanitized or censored version provided by Chinese operators in conjunction with the local regime.”