To understand the problem,
it helps to review the history
of intrusion detection. The field is generally considered
to have started in 1987 with a paper by Dorothy E. Denning,
a computer scientist then at SRI International, Menlo Park,
Calif. In "An Intrusion-Detection Model," published in "IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering", she described how
to model the statistical characteristics of a system operating
normally so that deviations from the model could be taken
as evidence that intruders were present.
Intrusion-detection systems attempt to detect things that are "wrong" in a computer
network or system. Because legitimate and illegitimate activities
often look alike, the diagnosis depends heavily on the context.
For instance, a single Web request sent to a computer may
be innocuous. If the same request, however, is sent to a large
number of computers across the planet, it may be part of reconnaissance
performed to find potential attack targets.
The problem of noticing when things are amiss is compounded by the need
to operate in an adversarial environment. Attackers pride
themselves on foreseeing the responses of common detection
systems and taking pains to sidestep or even exploit them.
Computer systems face a variety of threats—not only from worms
but also from viruses and other forms of attack. Each of these
threats is best detected by a different method.
A virus, for example, is a program that embeds itself within another
program. It executes when that program executes, typically
causing some mischief, like deleting data, altering a display,
or scrolling a message. Just as human viruses need a cell
to reproduce, computer viruses need a host program. They cannot
spread from one computer to another on their own; usually,
they get into a computer when a naive user runs an infected
program, often by opening an infected e-mail attachment. Viruses
can often be detected by observing changes in the files stored
on the machine.
Worms, unlike viruses, are specifically designed to propagate through
a network, usually the Internet, replicating themselves at
each machine before jumping to new ones. No human action is
needed for a worm to get from one computer to another. In
most cases, the frenetic activity and communication the worm
causes is itself the point: a worm like Sapphire creates so
much network traffic so quickly that it overwhelms routers
and other network nodes, in what is called a denial-of-service
attack.
Thus, while viruses are an enormous problem, it is worms that generally
get the most intense media coverage, because their outbreaks
can affect many millions of people at the same time and cause
significant economic havoc as well. There are straightforward
ways of detecting a worm attack—a flooded network is
a pretty good initial indicator—but, as recent experience
has shown, many of the defensive measures don't function fast enough
to contain the spread of an effectively written worm.