They were 376 bytes that shook the world.
At 5:30 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time on the morning of 25 January 2003, the
Sapphire worm began dispatching copies of itself to the Internet.
The worm, also known as SQL Slammer, began infecting computers
running a very popular Microsoft database program, Microsoft
SQL Server.
To infect a computer, the worm first sent itself to a specific communications
port of the computer, one the SQL Server used to send and
receive requests. When the computer attempted to process the
"request," the worm caused a data buffer in the computer to
overflow. The overflow in turn caused the computer to install
Sapphire, which then sent copies of itself over the Internet.
And so it went, computer after computer, with astonishing
speed and efficiency.
The virus began infecting a widening circle of computers in a contagion
that zoomed around the world, doubling every 8.5 seconds.
By 5:40 a.m., just 10 minutes after it was unleashed, Sapphire
had spread to at least 70 000 computers—90 percent of
all the vulnerable machines in the world. The worm's paltry
few hundred bytes carried no malicious payload and so deleted
no data or software. But the sheer torrent of data coursing
over the Internet consumed nearly all available capacity,
crashing networks, bank ATMs, and flight-scheduling systems.
After the dust settled, a few days later, a London computer security
firm, Mi2g Ltd., estimated that Sapphire had caused about
US $1 billion in damages, related mostly to lost productivity.
Incredibly enough, Sapphire was at that time only the ninth most costly
computer attack on record, according to the London firm. And
it was an unfortunate harbinger of things to come: in February
2004 alone, Mi2g estimates, various malevolent attacks caused
upwards of $68 billion in damages worldwide, much of it due
to worms, such as MyDoom and several others that rampaged
through the Internet that month. Ever since the first worms
were released on the world in the late 1980s, those who write
them and those who fight them—including the developers
of computer intrusion-detection systems—have been engaged
in a sort of arms race [see sidebar, Worm
Evolution"].
At IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, we're working on a remedy for
worms that differs from other approaches in targeting worms
specifically rather than trying to prevent all breaches of
computer security. Our system, called Billy Goat, does just
one thing but does it extremely accurately.
Protection of a computer system begins with good locks, in the form of
hardware and software barriers. But just as homeowners often
keep watchdogs to sniff out a burglar even after he has gotten
past a locked door, so do many of today's systems monitor
suspicious activities that take place inside a computer.