31 January 2005—Most savvy computer users now
rely on a variety of filters to screen e-mail for
phrases such as "Lower your insurance rates now!"
and "Hot XXX Action!" and instantly relegate the
spam to the trash can and the sender to an e-mail
blacklist. But what happens when spammers go
undercover?
Junk senders are adopting the strategy called
spoofing, which works like germs that mutate to elude
the immune system. Spoofed e-mail bamboozles people into
opening it by claiming to be from some legitimate
sender, such as citibank.com or whitehouse.gov. The
bogus domain names often project such authority that
recipients comply with the spammers' requests for
confidential information like credit card numbers
and secure passwords. "If I had a nickel for every time
I said, "I wish I could trust the sender," I'd be rich,"
says Miles Libbey, Yahoo! Inc.'s antispam product
manager.
Over the past few months, Libbey and other
antispam czars have responded to spoofers with some
creative tactics of their own. By modifying the way
e-mail is sent and delivered, major ISPs can confirm
the origin of e-mail purporting to be from a given
domain. The major push toward perfecting these
verification technologies began last June, when the
Anti-Spam Technical Alliance (ASTA), whose members
include America Online, Comcast, EarthLink, Microsoft,
and Yahoo!, advocated steps toward the broad
adoption of sender-authentication mechanisms. And
the fruits of that effort have come into use in the last
couple of months.
ISPs and tech firms have primarily taken two
technical paths. DomainKeys, developed by Yahoo! Inc.,
uses cryptographic authentication to determine the
domain identity of a sender. Microsoft's Sender ID
and AOL's Sender Policy Framework (SPF) check to see
whether the e-mail comes from an IP address that the
sending domain in question has authorized.
These schemes are still being refined, but they
are already being widely implemented. DomainKeys
began large-scale tests on Google's Gmail in November
and began signing all outgoing e-mail from Yahoo!
and EarthLink in December. Sender ID has signed up
218 000 domains, and AOL and thousands of other
prominent domains and service providers are using
SPF to vet all incoming messages.
While each antispoofing strategy has its own
advantages and drawbacks, DomainKeys' cryptographic
approach to domain verification is consistently cited by
antispam specialists as the most foolproof of the
current solutions. When a domain or ISP adopts the
DomainKeys system, it must first generate a pair of
numerical "keys," one public and one private. The
correct public key can be used to decrypt data that
was encrypted using the private key. The public key is
published in the Domain Name System (DNS), a
comprehensive Internet directory service, and the
private key is made available only to the domain's
outbound e-mail servers.
The text and header information for every e-mail
sent by an authorized user within the system is
encrypted by the private key to produce a digital
signature that is appended to the e-mail's header.
The encrypted signature appears to be a random string
of numbers. After receiving e-mail, servers that support
DomainKeys authentication look up the public key in
DNS for the e-mail's purported domain of origin. It
uses this public key to try to decrypt the e-mail's
digital signature. If the decrypted signature
matches the e-mail header and message, this proves
that the e-mail comes from where it says it originated.
Because it forms the digital signature from the
complete message in addition to the header,
DomainKeys can also tell if an e-mail's text has been
tampered with in transit.
IP-based authentication techniques, such as those
employed by SPF and Sender ID, are not as reliable,
because certain forwarding mechanisms can impair their
usefulness, according to Libbey and other industry
experts. If a Yahoo! customer has a forwarding
e-mail address issued by IEEE, for example, the message
will register as having been sent by an IP
associated with ieee.org , not yahoo.com. Because
sending e-mail via a forwarding address involves
redirecting it through an alternate domain, the IP
address of the original sending domain is lost, and
SPF or Sender ID systems might flag the legitimate
e-mail as a spoof. "The drawback with any method
that's not based on cryptography is that you can't
really predict the path your mail will take," says
EarthLink chief technology officer Tripp Cox. "When
you use cryptography, it doesn't matter so much what
the path is, you can always get back to the sender."
On the other hand experts point out that if an
intermediary forwarding domain appends anything to a
DomainKeys-guaranteed e-mail, such as a signature of its
own, the message will be assumed to be spoofed.
Cox, Libbey, and others emphasize that Sender ID,
SPF, and DomainKeys are not by themselves absolute
spam fixes—they're merely a few of the arrows in a
varied and well-stocked quiver. Sender
identification strategies are not mutually exclusive;
they can all be deployed at the same time, and, in fact,
enhance each other's effectiveness. The SPF
protocol, for instance, allows the owner of a particular
domain (say, ieee.org) to specify which computers are
authorized to send messages with @ieee.org in the
address. DomainKeys provides a supplemental layer of
security by ensuring that all sent messages from
SPF-authorized machines have been encrypted by a
private key known to ieee.org administrators alone
and cannot be tampered with en route to their
destinations.
At the same time, all of the sender ID strategies
when used in concert with long-established strategies
such as filtering all messages for spam-associated words
and subject lines and blacklisting, or curtailing
incoming mail from IP addresses or domain names that
are known to be spammers. "We're taking one tool out
of the spammers' arsenal," Libbey says. "DomainKeys is
not going to stop spammers, but it's certainly going to
take away one of their most important techniques."
Insiders are optimistic that the sheer extent of
the spam scourge will encourage domains and ISPs to
adopt these new standards quickly. "The success of any
e-mail authentication initiative requires swift and
broad industrywide cooperation," says a Microsoft
spokesperson, "and momentum for this kind of standard is
building." To facilitate widespread adoption, Yahoo! and
Microsoft are granting royalty-free, nonexclusive
licenses to any domain owner who wants to implement
DomainKeys or Sender ID.
As antispam techniques go into action, e-mail
from unidentifiable senders will be relegated to
third-class status, says Meng Weng Wong, the
developer of SPF. Spammers would then be forced to
abandon one of their most time-tested and successful
tactics—and inboxes will be, if not spam-free, at
least less cluttered.