Microsoft came out with its own browser, Internet Explorer, in 1995, to compete with Netscape. But Explorer's merits were not enough by themselves to persuade people to choose it. That may surprise you, but there was never any doubt about it inside Microsoft. Many internal memos and e-mails, over the entire period of the browser war, explain convincingly how and why Netscape was going to win. The fundamental reason was that Netscape had too much of a head start.

So to hang on to their supremacy, Microsoft executives adapted classic monopolistic tactics to the particular circumstances of the PC industry at the end of the 20th century. Basically, what they did was systematically block widespread distribution of superior new technologies and prevent third parties from collaborating with innovators.

They also warned original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) away from Netscape Navigator by threatening to revoke their Windows license if they did not comply. They paid Internet service providers and firms like America Online to distribute only Internet Explorer because they were concerned they would "lose all those side-by-side user choices," according to Cameron Myhrvold, the product's own marketing manager.

When an OEM like Hewlett-Packard came up with valuable innovations that let users easily set up their own computers—and choose the browser they wanted—Microsoft banned them. Similarly, the company forced Intel to withdraw its support for Sun's Java, the original Java and a rival to Microsoft's version.

Through these tactics, and more, Microsoft forced developers of PC software to favor Internet Explorer if their software worked automatically with a browser, and to favor Microsoft's Java if their product linked to Java. Those were the tactics that drove the outcome of the browser and Java wars, which was (no surprise) a total victory all around for Microsoft.

The point of all this was to have the Windows monopoly survive competition "born on the Internet," as Bill Gates put it in 1995. Over a period of years, as Microsoft memos clearly show, executives concluded that the Internet threatened their monopoly position, and that they could not thwart it by producing better products. So they used unlawful tactics to keep customers from getting a chance to choose new technologies.

Microsoft's success in recent years has come from blocking users and developers from innovations by other companies that could threaten Microsoft's dominance

They also imposed what insiders called a "strategy tax" on their own browser developers—browser improvements that would benefit customers could nevertheless be nixed if they didn't improve the strategic position of Windows and Office, Microsoft's core products. With all of Microsoft's talent, it is not surprising that some of their own people complained bitterly about these tactics—they wanted to try to win on the merits of their creations rather than by brute force.

The damaging and distorting effects of those tactics harm computer users to this day. The Netscape browser, Java on PCs, and multimedia technologies from Intel have all disappeared from the marketplace. Indeed, Microsoft goes on blocking distribution of innovations by others, as documents introduced at the trials show. Examples include multimedia software from Real Networks and Nokia, as well as Nokia software to synch handheld data with your PC.

When efforts to prevent competition kill an innovative product or company, more than technology is lost. If Navigator, for instance, were still robust, middleware entrepreneurs would have two choices of distribution partner: Microsoft and Netscape. As a result, we have lost the opportunity even to consider new technologies not approved by Microsoft.

The bottom line is that, had Microsoft obeyed the law, we would have had much more innovation and competition over the last seven years. Moreover, much of that lost activity would have focused on the interface between the PC and the Internet—an area where more innovation would have been particularly welcome.