The Microsoft antitrust trial, probably the most important technology-related
legal case of our time, appears to be limping at last toward
a conclusion.
Unfortunately, there is an excellent chance that the software colossus will
win despite losing, without much to restrain it from going
back to the heavy-handed, anticompetitive tactics that prompted
the antitrust action in the first place.
Not just the competitors and would-be competitors of Microsoft Corp.
will lose: you and I will, too. We will continue being denied
innovations that only real and rigorous competition can bring.
In many cases we won't know what we're missing, because one
sorry effect of monopolistic domination is that many innovations
do not even get the chance to be tested in the market.
Those of you who have lost track of the trial proceedings can be
forgiven. The trial began five years ago as an action filed
by the U.S. Department of Justice and 18 states and the District
of Columbia. The suit's milestones include the April 2000
decision of U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson,
who found Microsoft had violated U.S. antitrust laws. Two
months later, he ordered the company broken into two separate
entities.
In June 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld Jackson's finding of
violations. But it overturned Jackson's order, removed him
from the case, and turned the proceedings over to Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly, of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia.
Last October, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered the Justice Department,
Microsoft, and the states to negotiate a settlement. In November,
Microsoft, Justice, and nine of the states agreed on terms
to settle the case (the others are continuing the suit on
their own). Under the settlement, Microsoft would not be split
apart. Moreover, the restrictions that would be placed on
the company are so riddled with loopholes that it is difficult
to see how they could possibly rein in the company's entrenched
anticompetitive behavior. At press time, observers were eagerly
awaiting an announcement from Judge Kollar-Kotelly about whether
she would accept the proposed settlement or would insist on
more rigorous measures against the software giant.
As it stands, the proposed agreement offers plenty of opportunity
for Microsoft to go on as it has. For example, one provision
would permit users to choose non-Microsoft software as the
default on their computers. Microsoft, however, can dictate
that the software use Microsoft technologies. That caveat
is just one of many in the settlement that would continue
to block competitively innovative software.
Anyone who has followed Microsoft's history will have little doubt
about whether the company will exploit these loopholes to
continue bullying those who want to use or distribute its
competitors' products. Microsoft's success in recent years
has come from blocking users and developers from innovations
by other companies that could threaten Microsoft's dominance.
That is the essence of the company's violation of the antitrust
laws, and its bad effects continue to the present day.
Web-browsing technologies are just one example. Countless memos show that
in the 1990s Microsoft's senior executives saw Internet innovation,
especially so-called middleware technologies that link the
PC to the Web, as a threat to their monopoly position in Windows.
From 1995 until the end of the browser war, they were particularly
worried about losing user and developer attention to Netscape
Communications' Navigator browser, to Sun Microsystems' Java
architecture, and to other new Internet-related technologies.